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This dissertation consists of three essays organized as chapters. On the first chapter, I revisit
the discussions which evaluate different fluctuations of major economic variables produced
by different monetary policy rules for small open economies, given the existence of liability
dollarization. In particular, monetary rules which either include or exclude exchange rate
stability as a monetary policy objective. I extend these argument by adding shocks to the
risk premium for foreign borrowing to a calibrated small open economy DSGE model with
sticky prices and monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market. In addition I
consider two monetary policy rules; one which put high weight on real exchange rate stability,
and one which puts low weight on real exchange rate stability. With this model, I analyse the
fluctuations of major macroeconomic variables under these two rules. It is found that there
are variations in the fluctuations of the economic variables under these rules. In particular
it is found that for risk premium shock, higher weights on real exchange rate stability in the
monetary policy rule, amplifies the response of the macroeconomic variables.
On the second chapter, I extend the model of the first paper by computing the optimal
monetary policy rule under liability dollarization and given risk premium shocks. In this
chapter I also consider three monetary policy rules; one which put high weight on real
exchange rate stability, and one which puts low weight on real exchange rate stability and
the optimal monetary policy rule, and analyse the fluctuations of major macroeconomic
variables under these three rules. It is found that for risk premium shocks, higher weights
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on real exchange rate stability in the monetary policy rule, amplifies the response of the
macroeconomic variables. However the welfare maximizing monetary policy rule result in
more stable macroeconomic variables, but it requires some real exchange rate fluctuations.
In the last chapter I attempt to answer two questions; how does foreign interest rate
shocks and monetary policy shocks affect the quantity of bank credit to the domestic private
non-financial sectors in small open developing countries? To what extent does monetary
policy can influence the quantity of bank credit in these countries? This chapter uses a
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model on a sample of six small open developing
countries to answers these two questions. I found that an increase in foreign interest rates
can either increase or decrease the quantity of bank credit, depending on how strong the
increase in foreign interest rate shocks affect total interest income compared to the total
interest cost of the bank’s balance sheet. On the other hand, I found that the impact of a
monetary contraction is to reduce the quantity of bank credit, which is consistent with the
finding from previous literature. In addition, it is found that, at best, monetary policy can
influence quantity of bank credit only in the short run. With the exception of Mexico, I
found that both monetary policy and foreign interest rates influences the quantity of bank
credit in these economies in the longer horizon. These results suggests that the monetary
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Risk Premium Shocks, Monetary
Policy and Economic Fluctuations in




In the literature of small open economies which employs New Keynesian models there has been dis-
cussion which evaluate the different fluctuations of major economic variables produced by different
monetary policy rules which either include or exclude exchange rate stability as a monetary policy
objective, given the existence of liability dollarization. However there is still some mixed results on
this discussion. An important feature of these models is that they do not include shocks to the risk
premium for foreign borrowing. It has been shown that risk premium in relation to foreign borrow-
ing has an impact on macroeconomic fluctuations. Furthermore there are studies which show that
liability dollarization is related to the risk premium from foreign borrowing. This paper revisits
and extends this discussion. In particular this paper develops a New Keynesian Model consistent
with liability dollarization, and includes shocks to the risk premium of foreign borrowing. With this
model in mind this paper explore the question, how does fluctuations of major economic variables
compare between monetary policy rule which put high weight on real exchange rate stability, with
that of a monetary policy rule that put low weight on real exchange rate stability?
JEL: E1, E3, E5, F31, F34
Keywords: risk premium shocks, liability dollarization, fluctuations, policy rules.
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1.1 Introduction
Macroeconomic stability is an important objective for many nations. An important policy
instrument to achieve this objective is monetary policy. Due to many factors and compli-
cations which may influence the business cycle, conducting the appropriate monetary policy
regime is not always obvious. An important factor which may influence the conduct of mon-
etary policy in small open economies is the issue of liability dollarization. For a number
of developing countries which have an open capital account, their residents may be in the
following situation. On one hand if their residents borrow external funds from international
capital markets, it must be denominated in foreign currency, and they must repay the prin-
cipal and interest to the creditors in foreign currency as well. On the other hand they invest
these funds in projects in the domestic economy which generate income in domestic currency.
However the forward markets involving the domestic currencies of these countries are either
non-existent or thin and illiquid.
To highlight this last point, table A.1 and A.1 in the appendix shows data on daily
average turnover of foreign exchange rate derivative, from The Bank of International Settle-
ment. This table shows that the transaction for developing countries currencies is far less
than that for developed countries currencies. In addition it should be mentioned that this
survey was participated by 53 countries, but the table only shows the break down for only 24
countries. The other remaining 29 participating countries currencies are lumped under the
category other currencies. This highlights that the market for instruments to hedge against
exchange rate risk for developing countries currencies are very limited. In addition, there
are 180 legal tenders among the members of the United Nations. This highlight the point
that markets for instruments to hedge against exchange rate risks for currencies of many of
developing countries are not existent.
Given that the forward markets involving the domestic currencies of developing countries
are either non-existent or thin and illiquid, this makes it difficult and costly to hedge against
3
exchange rate risk. In the literature this situation is termed as liability dollarization or
currency mismatch (Eichengreen and Hausman, 1999, Calvo 2002 and Cepedes et.al. 2002,
Calvo (2006), Nakamura, 2011). Furthermore Calvo (2006), has expressed concerns that
liability dollarization present a challenge for small open economies in conducting monetary
policy.
There are discussions on the impact of liability dollarization on the choice of monetary
policy rule which in their analysis employ a New Keynesian Model. However there is still
mixed results on this discussion. On one hand Cespedes et.al. (2004) assuming sticky wages
concluded that a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting provide more macroeconomic
stability compared to a fixed exchange rate regime in insulating the economy against external
shocks. Following from the result of this study, Nakamura (2011) also found that a monetary
policy targeting rule which addresses terms of trade fluctuations by attempting to stabilize
the real exchange rate is not efficient. In contrast Cook (2004) and Choi and Cook (2004)
which assumes sticky prices found that a fixed exchange rate rule offer greater stability than
an interest rule that targets inflation.
A common feature of the above papers is that they do not consider shocks in the
risk premium from foreign borrowing as a driving force in the fluctuations of important
macroeconomic variables. Honig (2009) shown that liability dollarization is a consequence
and is influenced by the lack of faith of towards the government of the developing country
which stems from the belief that they will not follow policies that promote long-run exchange
rate stability. And political uncertainty and government policies uncertainty have an impact
on the risk premium (Pastor and Veronesi 2013). Furthermore Korinek (2011) shown that
there is a relationship between foreign currency debt and the risk premium from foreign
borrowing. This paper further shows that a small increase in international risk aversion
would have an affect the risk premium and on the volatility of macroeconomic variables in
the small open economy.
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The current paper revisits and extends the preceding discussion relating to monetary
policy in a small open economy under liability dollarization. In particular this study develops
a New Keynesian small open economy model with liability dollarization which includes shock
to the risk premium from foreign borrowing. To the best of the authors knowledge, this
is the first study which employs such setting in a study of monetary policy under liability
dollarization. With this model in mind this paper explore the question, how does fluctuations
of major macroeconomic variables compare between monetary policy rules which put high
weight on real exchange rate stability with that of a monetary policy rule that put low weight
on real exchange rate stability?
1.2 The Model
Consider a New Keynesian small open economy model. There are three agents in this
economy: a unit mass of atomistic identical and infinitely lived households, a continuum
of domestic producers and a monetary authority. These economic agents form rational
expectations. There exists a world financial market. The economy is assumed as a net
borrower in the world financial market. The households own labor and capital and purchase
one period bonds denominated in domestic currency. The households can use the proceeds
from the maturing bonds together with their wage earning and their return from capital to
purchase more bonds, invest in capital and consumption goods. Further assume that the
excess of households expenditure to the proceeds received is financed by borrowing foreign
currency from the international capital market.
In this model we assume (1) the economy faces liability dollarization. In other words,
given a world interest rate, the domestic households can only borrow and repay the principal
and interest from foreign borrowing in foreign currency, (2) for simplicity assume that there
is no forward foreign exchange market involving the domestic currency so that domestic
5
agents cannot hedge against foreign exchange rate risk using the foreign exchange futures
market.
1.2.1 Households
To model the household this paper uses a modified version of Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2003).
A representative household choose consumption and labor and seeks to maximize preference.
The households own production firms. The households obtain income from supplying labor
and capital to firms and lumps sum profit from the firms producing intermediate goods and
firms producing final goods. In addition the household accumulate debt at the end of the
period t. Furthermore assume that the households purchase one period bonds denominated
in domestic currency. The households can use the proceeds from the maturing bonds to-
gether with their wage earning and their return capital to purchase more bonds, invest in
capital and consumption goods. The excess of households expenditure to the proceeds re-
ceived is financed by borrowing foreign currency from the international capital market. This
represents the constraint faced by the household.
The representative household problem is to choose consumption of final goods and hours
of work that would maximize the households utility subject to the above budget constraint.


































Denote ct, ht, prt, Dt, D
∗
t , Yt, Kt, it, Pt, St as real consumption, hours of work, nominal
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domestic interest rate, risk premium from foreign borrowing, nominal domestic bonds (mea-
sured in domestic output), nominal foreign debt (measured in foreign output), final output,
capital, real investment, and the domestic price, and nominal exchange rate. Following Notz
and Rosenkranz (2014), the households budget constraint presented above exhibits liability
dollarization.
We assume the following definition for the gross domestic interest rate and the gross
foreign interest rate as follows.




t−1 = 1 + r
w + prt−1 (1.3)
In borrowing foreign funds, the house has to pay a constant risk free interest rate and
a risk premium. The risk premium in turn is endogenously determined by the amount of























+ (spt − 1) (1.5)
Following Notz and Rosenkranz (2014), the endogenous term of the risk premium equa-
tion above presents a feature of financial frictions.
The risk premium shock is exogenous follows an AR(1) process of the following form.
lnspt = ρsplnspt−1 + εsp,t (1.6)
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This is the inter-temporal substitution condition of the household (Euler equation).







hω−1t = λtwt (1.8)
While the inter-temporal substitution between consumption and purchasing capital is
as follows:
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(1.9)























































































The model specification for the production sector is a modified version of Dib (2011). The
goods producing sector consists of domestically produced final goods producing firms and
intermediate producing firms. Assume that there are a unit measure of intermediate pro-
ducing firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] which produces a differentiated product. The final goods
firm produces Yt by combining the intermediate goods Yt(i) as inputs using the following











The final goods firms sells its product in a perfectly competitive market. Given the
















The first order condition of the above problem into the following demand curve for each
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For the intermediate goods producing sector, assume that the domestic intermediate
goods is divided between intermediate goods domestically sold,Yht(i),and exported, Yxt(i) so
that
Yt(i) = Yht(i) + Yxt(i) (1.15)








The production function common to all intermediate producing firms in the economy is






The firms producing intermediate goods for use in the domestic economy each acts
as a monopolistic competitor. Assume that the price setting ability of each of these firms
are constraint the demand curve its faces for its product from the representative final goods
producing firms. In addition each firms producing intermediate goods for use in the domestic
economy faces a convex price adjustment cost proportional to one unit of final goods as
defined by Rotemberg (1982).
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The first order condition for the domestically used intermediate goods producing firms
are the following.












1−α Insert equation 1.20 (1.19)















φ(πt−1)πt] = 0 (1.20)
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Denote the nominal exchange rate as St,following Dib (2011), assume that the interme-
diate goods producers cannot price discriminate so that the export price of the intermediate
good is Pt(i)/St. . It is also assumed that the foreign demand function for domestic exports







The total foreign demand for exports of domestically produced intermediate goods fol-







1.2.3 The Central Bank
Assume that the central bank of the small open economy actively manages short term interest
rate Rt in response to deviation from output Yt inflation πt growth of money supply µt and
the real exchnage rate St. In addition the monetary policy rule faces a monetary policy





















The variables without the time subscripts are in steady state. The monetary policy
shock follows the following law of motion.
lnνt = ρνlnνt−1 + ενt; ρνε(0, 1) (1.24)
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1.2.4 Market Clearing Condition
















(πt − 1)2Yt (1.25)
While the trade balance is given as follows.
tbt = Yt − ct − it (1.26)






Assuming symmetry among all consumers, domestic producers and importers, firms, the








The Calibration of the parameters for the households and firms models for this current study
follows from Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2003), Peters (2008), and Unsal (2013). For the elasticity
of output with respect to capital α it is set at 0.32. The coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ is set to be 2. The 1 plus the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ω
in labor supply is set to be 1.455. The capital adjustment cost parameter Ψk is set to be
0.028. The debt elastic risk premium parameter Ψp is set to be 0.000742. These parameter
values are consistent with consistent with Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2003). The parameter of
monopoly power φ is set to be 10. The parameter of price adjustment cost is set to be 120.
These parameter values are consistent with Unsal (2013). Following Schmitt Grohe Uribe,
the world interest rate in this model is constant. The world interest rate rw is calibrated to
be 0.02102. This implies the consumption elasticity rate of time preference β is set to be
0.979413. The output gap parameter ρy in the monetary policy rule is set to be 0.5. While
the parameter for the inflation gap ρπ is set to be 0.8098. This is consistent with Peters
(2008).
This current study considers two different monetary policy rules. One which put a small
weight on real exchange rate stabilization ρs in the monetary policy rule (case1). Another
monetary policy rule is to put a large weight (in absolute value) on the real exchange rate
stabilization in the monetary policy rule (case 2). For the small weight, this paper set the
value of the real exchange rate stability in the monetary policy rule as ρs = 0.15668 . For
the large weight, this paper set the weight on real exchange rate stabilization to ρs = 1 .
And in order to get a clearer picture of the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables under
case 2, this study as increases the value weight in case 2 to be ρs = 6 . This in the impulse
response is the ones labeled with the number3.
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1.4 Analysis
In this analysis will consider the impulse responses of several macroeconomic variables. These
variables are domestic output (y), consumption (c), domestic inflation , current account-
to-GDP ratio (ca), trade balance-to-GDP ratio (tb), foreign debt (d) and investment (i).
This study considers five shocks; productivity shocks and foreign output shock and foreign
inflation shock, risk premium shock and monetary policy shocks. In the impulse responses is
constructed for the two monetary policy rules; case 1 in which the weight on real exchange
rate stability is low and case 2 in which the weight on real exchange rate stability is high as
specified above.
1.4.1 Productivity Shock
Consider a positive productivity shock. Following a positive productivity shock, domestic
output (y) rise in both case1 and case 2 monetary policy rules mentioned above. Similarly,
a positive productivity shock result into a rise in investment (i) and foreign debt (d) in
both monetary policy rule cases. And this shock results in a rise current account deficit-
to-GDP ratio (ca) in both cases. (Figure 1 to 6 in Appendix A). In contrast, consumption
and domestic inflation fell due to a positive productivity shock in both case 1 and case 2
monetary rules considered. Similarly a positive productivity shock result into a fall in trade
balance surplus-to GDP-ratio. (Figures 1 to 7 in the Appendix)
For the dynamics of all variables considered above, the impulse response depicts that
a monetary Policy rule which place high weight on real exchange rate stability results in
less fluctuations of macroeconomic variables in the case of productivity shocks. For these
variables, this supports the argument that a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize the
real exchange rate would support macroeconomic stability as compared to a rule with fully
flexible exchange rate.
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As a note, the difference in macroeconomic variable fluctuations between the two mone-
tary policy rule cases is relatively larger for domestic output, current account, trade balance
and foreign debt. On the other hand the difference in macroeconomic variable fluctuations is
relatively smaller for investment, consumption and domestic inflation. This indicates that,
for the case of productivity shock, the impact of a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize
the real exchange rate the effect is larger for domestic output, current account, trade balance
and foreign debt, as compared to domestic output, consumption, investment and domestic
inflation.
1.4.2 World output shock
Now consider a positive world output shock. Following a positive world output shock, domes-
tic output and consumption rises in both case 1 and case 2 monetary policy rules mentioned
above. Similarly, a positive world output shock result into a rise investment and foreign debt
in both monetary policy rule cases. Furthermore a positive world output shock result in a
rise current account deficit-to-GDP ratio in both cases. (Figures 8 to 14 in the Appendix)
In contrast domestic inflation fell due to a positive world output shock in both case 1 and
case 2 monetary rules considered. Similarly a positive world output shock result into a fall
in trade balance surplus-to GDP-ratio.
For the dynamics of all variables considered above, the impulse response depicts that
a monetary Policy rule which place high weight on real exchange rate stability results in
less fluctuations of macroeconomic variables in the case of world output shocks. For these
variables, this result supports the argument that a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize
the real exchange rate would provide higher macroeconomic stability as compared to a rule
with fully flexible exchange rate.
As a note, the difference in macroeconomic variable fluctuations between the two mone-
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tary policy rule cases is relatively larger for foreign debt. On the other hand the difference in
macroeconomic variable fluctuations is relatively smaller for domestic output, consumption,
investment, current account deficit-to-GDP ratio, trade balance surplus-to GDP-ratio and
domestic inflation. This indicates that, for the case of world output shock, the impact of
a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize the real exchange rate the effect is larger for
foreign debt, as compared to the other macroeconomic variables.
1.4.3 Foreign inflation shock
Now consider a positive foreign inflation shock. Following a positive foreign inflation shock,
this would increase domestic output and domestic inflation. Furthermore a positive foreign
inflation shock increases the trade balance surplus-to-GDP ratio and foreign debt. Also
this shock increases the deficit of current account deficit-to-GDP ratio. However, a positive
foreign inflation shock results in a decrease in consumption and investment. (Figures 15 to
21 in the Appendix).
The impulse response also depicts that a monetary Policy rule which place high weight
on real exchange rate stability gives less fluctuations of macroeconomic variables in the case
of world output shocks. This supports the argument that a monetary policy which attempt
to stabilize the real exchange rate would support macroeconomic stability as compared to a
rule with fully flexible exchange rate.
1.4.4 Risk Premium shock
Now consider a positive monetary policy shock. Following a positive risk premium shock,
domestic output (y) and consumption (c) rises in both case1 and case 2 monetary policy rules
mentioned above. Similarly, a positive monetary policy shock result into a rise in domestic
inflation, surplus of trade balance to GDP ratio, in both monetary policy rule cases. In
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contrast a positive monetary policy shock results in a fall of the foreign debt and the deficit
of current account-GDP-ratio and investment, in both case 1 and case 2 monetary rules
considered. (Figures 22 to 28 in the Appendix)
For the dynamics of all variables considered above, the impulse response depicts that
a monetary Policy rule which place low weight on real exchange rate stability gives less
fluctuations of macroeconomic variables under consideration in the case of risk premium
shocks. This supports the argument that a monetary policy with a flexible exchange rate
would support macroeconomic stability as compared to a rule which attempt to stabilize the
real exchange rate.
As a note, the difference in macroeconomic variable fluctuations between the two mon-
etary policy rule cases is relatively larger for investment, the deficit of current account-
GDP-ratio, trade balance surplus-to GDP-ratio and foreign debt. On the other hand the
difference in macroeconomic variable fluctuations is relatively smaller for domestic output,
consumption and domestic inflation. This indicates that, for the case of risk premium shock,
the impact of a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize the real exchange rate the effect
is larger for investment, the deficit of current account-GDP-ratio, trade balance surplus-to
GDP-ratio and foreign debt, as compared to domestic output, consumption and domestic
inflation.
1.4.5 Monetary policy shock
Finally consider a positive monetary policy shock. Following a positive monetary policy
shock, domestic output and consumption falls in both case1 and case 2 monetary policy
rules mentioned above. Similarly, a positive monetary policy shock result into a fall in do-
mestic inflation, foreign debt and the deficit of current account-GDP-ratio in both monetary
policy rule cases. In contrast a positive monetary policy shock results in a rise of domestic
18
investment and the surplus of trade balance to GDP ratio in both case 1 and case 2 monetary
rules considered. (Figures 29 to 35 in the Appendix).
For the dynamics of all variables considered above, the impulse response depicts that
a monetary Policy rule which place high weight on real exchange rate stability gives less
fluctuations of macroeconomic variables under consideration in the case of monetary policy
shocks. This supports the argument that a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize the
real exchange rate would support macroeconomic stability as compared to a rule with a
flexible exchange rate.
As a note, the difference in macroeconomic variable fluctuations between the two mon-
etary policy rule cases is relatively larger the deficit of current account-GDP-ratio, trade
balance surplus-to GDP-ratio, investment and foreign debt. In contrast the impulse re-
sponse curves do not depict any difference in fluctuations for domestic output, consumption,
and domestic inflation. This indicates that, for the case of monetary policy shock, the impact
of a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize the real exchange rate, the effect is larger
for the deficit of current account-GDP-ratio, trade balance surplus-to GDP-ratio, investment
and foreign debt, compared to domestic output, consumption, and domestic inflation.
1.5 Conclusion
By specifying a New Keynesian model with liability dollarization and risk premium shocks,
results from this paper depicts that there are variations in the fluctuations of domestic
output, consumption, domestic inflation, current account deficit to-GDP-ratio, trade balance
surplus-to-GDP ratio, foreign debt and investment between a monetary policy rule which
put high weight on real exchange rate stability on one hand, and one which put which put
a low weight. Among them however, current account deficit-to-GDP ratio and foreign debt
consistently depicts large difference in magnitude of their fluctuations between the two policy
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rules under all five shocks considered. This result is consistent with the conclusion of Korinek
(2011). Moreover, for productivity shocks, world output shocks, monetary policy shocks
and foreign inflation shocks, the above analysis indicates that a monetary Policy rule which
place high weight on real exchange rate stability shows less fluctuation of the macroeconomic
variables. This supports the argument that a monetary policy which attempt to stabilize the
real exchange rate would support macroeconomic stability as compared to a rule with more
flexible exchange rate. Conversely for risk premium shocks, it supports the argument that
a monetary policy with more flexible exchange rate would support macroeconomic stability.
The future work of this paper is to extend the analysis to consider the optimal monetary
policy rule and analyze, how the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables under the optimal
monetary policy compares with that of the two monetary policy rules.
20
Bibliography
[1] Calvo, Guillermo A., 2002. “On dollarization”. Economics of Transition, 10 pp.393403.
[2] Cespedes, Luis Felipe, Roberto Chang, and Andrs Velasco, 2002. “Dollarization of Lia-
bilities, Net worth Effects, and Optimal Monetary Policy”, in Preventing Currency Crises
in Emerging Markets, Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey A. Frankel (eds).
[3] Cespedes, Luis Felipe, Roberto Chang, and Andrs Velasco, 2004. “Balance Sheets and
Exchange Rate Policy”,The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Sep., 2004), pp.
1183-1193
[4] Calvo, G.A, 2006. Monetary policy challenges in emerging markets: sudden stop, liability
dollarization, and lender of last resort, , 12788.NBER Working Paper, No.12788.
[5] Cavoli, Tony, 2009. “Is the fear of floating justified?: The East Asian experience”,Journal
of policy modeling, Vol. 31, pp.1-16
[6] Choi, Woon Gyu and David Cook. 2004. Liability dollarization and the bank balance
sheet channel, Journal of International Economics, 64 (2004) 247 275.
[7] David, Cook. 2004. “Monetary policy in emerging markets: Can liability dollarization
explain contractionary devaluations?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, No.51 (2004), pp.
1155 1181.
[8] Dib, Ali, 2011. “Monetary Policy in Estimated Models of Small Open and Closed
Economies”,Open Economic Review, No.22, pp.769-796.
[9] Eichengreen, Barry and Ricardo Hausmann, 1999. “Exchange Rate and Financial
Fragility”.NBER working papre,No. 7418
[10] Honig, A. (2009). “Dollarization, exchange rate regimes and government qual-
ity”.Journal of International Money and Finance ,Vol.2, No.28,
21
[11] Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart, 1998. “Financial Crises in Asia and
Latin America: Then and Now”,The American Economic Review , Vol.88, No.2, pp. 444-
448.
[12] Kollman, Robert. 2002. The Exchange Rate in a Dynamic-Optimizing Business Cycle
Model with Nominal Rigidities: A Quantitative Investigation.,Journal of International
Economics , No.55, pp.243-262.
[13] Korinek, Anton. 2011. “Foreign Currency Debt, Risk Premia and Macroeconomic
Volatility”,European Economic Review , Vol.55, pp. 371-385.
[14] McCallum, B.T, and E. Nelson. 1999. “Nominal Income Targeting in an Open Economy
Optimizing Model.”,Jounal of Monetary Economics, No.43, pp.553 578.
[15] Nakamura, Chikafumi, 2011. “Currency Mismatch, Balance-sheet effect and Monetary
Policy”, Journal of International Economic Studies , Vol.25 pp. 103128.
[16] Notz, Stefan and Peter Rosenkranz, 2014. “Bussines Cycles in Emerging Markets: the
Role of Liability Dollarization and Valuation Effcets”. University of Zurich Working Paper,
No.163.
[17] Pastor, Lubos, Pietro Veronesi. 2013. Political Uncertainty and Risk Premia ,Journal
of Finacial Economics, No. 110, pp. 520545.
[18] Peters, Amos C., 2008. “Exchange Rate targeting in an Estimated Small Open Econ-
omy”, mimeo, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
[19] Rotemberg, J.J. 1982. “Sticky Prices in the United States”,Journal of Political Economy,




Figure 1.1: Global foreign exchange market turnover by instrument, currency and
counterparty. Daily averages in April 2013, in billions of US dollars.
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Figure 1.2: : Global foreign exchange market turnover by instrument, currency and
counterparty. Daily averages in April 2013, in billions of US dollars (continued).
Figure 1.3: Domestic output with respect to productivity shock
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Figure 1.4: Consumption with respect to productivity shock
Figure 1.5: Current account deficit to GDP ratio with respect to productivity shock
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Figure 1.6: Surplus of trade balance to GDP ratio with respect to productivity shock
Figure 1.7: Foreign debt with respect to productivity shock
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Figure 1.8: Investment respect to productivity shock
Figure 1.9: Inflation respect to productivity shock
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Figure 1.10: Domestic output with respect to world output shock
Figure 1.11: Consumption with respect to world output shock
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Figure 1.12: Current account deficit to GDP ratio with respect to world output shock
Figure 1.13: Surplus of trade balance to GDP ratio with respect to world output shock
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Figure 1.14: foreign debt with respect to world output shock
Figure 1.15: Investment with respect to world output shock
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Figure 1.16: Domestic inflation with respect to world output shock
Figure 1.17: Domestic output with respect to foreign inflation shock
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Figure 1.18: Consumption with respect to foreign inflation shock
Figure 1.19: Current account deficit to GDP ratio with respect to foreign inflation shock
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Figure 1.20: Trade balance surplus to GDP ratio with respect to foreign inflation shock
Figure 1.21: Foreign debt with respect to foreign inflation shock
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Figure 1.22: investment with respect to foreign inflation shock
Figure 1.23: Domestic inflation with respect to foreign inflation shock
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Figure 1.24: Domestic output with respect to risk premium shocks
Figure 1.25: Consumtion with respect to risk premium shocks
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Figure 1.26: Current account deficit-to-GDP ratio with respect to risk premium shocks
Figure 1.27: Trade balance surplus-to-GDP ratio with respect to risk premium shocks
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Figure 1.28: Foreign debt with respect to risk premium shocks
Figure 1.29: Investment with respect to risk premium shocks
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Figure 1.30: Domestic inflation with respect to risk premium shocks
Figure 1.31: Domestic output with respect to monetary policy shocks
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Figure 1.32: Consumption with respect to monetary policy shocks
Figure 1.33: Current account deficit-to-GDP ratio with respect to monetary policy shocks
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Figure 1.34: Trade balance surplus-to-GDP ratio with respect to monetary policy shocks
Figure 1.35: Foreign debt with respect to monetary policy shocks
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Figure 1.36: Investment with respect to monetary policy shocks
Figure 1.37: Domestic inflation with respect to monetary policy shocks
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Chapter 2
Optimal Monetary Policy and
Economic Fluctuations in a Small
Open Economy with Liability




In the literature of small open economies which employs dynamic general equilibrium models there
has been discussions of optimal monetary policy rules, given the existence of liability dollarization.
However there is still some mixed results on this discussion. An important feature of these models
is that they do not include shocks to the risk premium from foreign borrowing. It has been shown
that risk premium in relation to foreign borrowing has an impact on macroeconomic fluctuations.
Furthermore there are studies which shows that liability dollarization is related to the risk premium
from foreign borrowing. This paper revisits and extend this discussion. In particular this paper
develops a New Keynesian Model consistent with liability dollarization, and includes shocks to the
risk premium of foreign borrowing, and asks, what is the optimal monetary policy rule in this
setting? In addition this paper compares the fluctuations of major macroeconomic variables under
the optimal monetary policy rule, with that of a monetary policy rule which put high weight on
real exchange rate stability and a monetary policy rule which put low weight on real exchange rate
stability.
JEL: E1, E3, E5, F31, F34
Keywords: risk premium shocks, liability dollarization, fluctuations, optimal monetary policy.
44
2.1 Introduction
Macroeconomic stability is an important objective for many nations. An important policy
instrument to achieve this objective is monetary policy. Due to many factors and compli-
cations which may influence the business cycle, conducting the appropriate monetary policy
is not always obvious. An important factor which may influence the conduct of monetary
policy in small open economies is the issue of liability dollarization. For a number of devel-
oping countries which have an open capital account, their residents may be in the following
situation. On one hand if their residents borrow external funds from international capital
markets, it must be denominated in foreign currency, and they must repay the principal
and interest to the creditors in foreign currency as well. On the other hand they invest
these funds in projects in the domestic economy which generate income in domestic cur-
rency. However the forward markets involving the domestic currencies of these countries are
either non-existent or thin and illiquid. This makes it difficult and costly to hedge against
exchange rate risk. In the literature this situation is termed as liability dollarization or
currency mismatch (Eichengreen and Hausman, 1999, Calvo 2002 and Cepedes et.al. 2002,
Calvo (2006), Nakamura, 2011). Furthermore Calvo (2006), has expressed concerns that
liability dollarization present a challenge for small open economies in conducting monetary
policy.
There are discussions on the impact of liability dollarization on the choice of monetary
policy rule which in their analysis employ a New Keynesian Model. However there is still
mixed results on this discussion. On one hand Cespedes et.al. (2004) assuming sticky wages
concluded that a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting provide more macroeconomic
stability compared to a fixed exchange rate regime in insulating the economy against external
shocks. In contrast Cook (2004) and Choi and Cook (2004) which assumes sticky prices
found that a fixed exchange rate rule offer greater stability than an interest rule that targets
inflation.
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A common feature of the above papers is that they do not consider shocks in the
risk premium from foreign borrowing as a driving force in the fluctuations of important
macroeconomic variables. Honig (2009) shown that liability dollarization is a consequence
and is influenced by the lack of faith of towards the government of the developing country
which stems from the belief that they will not follow policies that promote long-run exchange
rate stability. And political uncertainty and government policies uncertainty have an impact
on the risk premium (Pastor and Veronesi 2013). Furthermore Korinek (2011) shown that
there is a relationship between foreign currency debt and the risk premium from foreign
borrowing. This paper further shows that a small increase in international risk aversion
would affect the risk premium and then the volatility of macroeconomic variables in the
small open economy.
In relation to monetary policy and macroeconomic stability, there are discussions on
optimal monetary policy rules in small open economies. Kollmann (2002) computes a welfare
maximizing Taylor rule in a business cycle model for a small open economy. This paper
concludes that the optimal monetary policy rule is a Taylor rule of strict inflation targeting
with strong anti-inflationary stance which entail significant nominal and real exchange rate
volatility. Similarly Gali and Monacelli (2005) which also compute a welfare based optimal
monetary for small open economies concluded that inflation targeting coupled substantial
volatility of the exchange rate and the terms of trade is the optimal monetary policy for
this small open economy. It should be noted that these paper are calibrated for developed
countries small open economies and assume a frictionless international financial markets.
In contrast to the above Monacelli (2013) showed that openness of the economy requires
optimal monetary policy to deviate from the canonical principle of strict price stability.
Furthermore this paper concluded that the optimal monetary policy for an open economy is
price stability coupled with some degree of real exchange rate stability. In addition Corsetti,
Dedola and Leduc ( 2011), which incorporates international financial market imperfections
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concluded that the optimal monetary policy is characterized by inflation targeting, output
gap targeting and real exchange rate gap targeting.
The current paper revisits and extends the preceding discussion relating to optimal
monetary policy in a small open economy under liability dollarization. In particular this
study develops a New Keynesian small open economy model with liability dollarization
which includes shock to the risk premium from foreign borrowing. To the best of the authors
knowledge, this is the first study which employ such setting in a study of monetary policy
under liability dollarization. With this model in mind this paper explore the questions what
is the optimal monetary policy rule in this setting, and how does fluctuations of major
macroeconomic variables compare between the optimal monetary policy rule with monetary
policy rules which put high weight on real exchange rate stability with that of a monetary
policy rule that put low weight on real exchange rate stability?
2.2 The Model
Consider a New Keynesian small open economy model. There are three agents in this
economy: a unit mass of atomistic identical and infinitely lived households, a continuum
of domestic producers and a monetary authority. These economic agents form rational
expectations. There exists a world financial market. The economy is assumed as a net
borrower in the world financial market. The households own labor and capital and purchase
one period bonds denominated in domestic currency. The households can use the proceeds
from the maturing bonds together with their wage earning and their return from capital
to purchase more bonds, invest in capital and consumption goods. Further assume that
the excess of households expenditure to the proceeds received is financed by borrowing
foreign currency from the international capital market. In this model we assume (1) the
economy faces liability dollarization. In other words, given a world interest rate, the domestic
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households can only borrow and repay the principal and interest from foreign borrowing
in foreign currency, (2) for simplicity assume that there is no forward foreign exchange
market involving the domestic currency so that domestic agents cannot hedge against foreign
exchange rate risk using the foreign exchange futures market.
2.2.1 Households
To model the household this paper uses a modified version of Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2003).
A representative household choose consumption and labor and seeks to maximize preference.
The households own production firms. The households obtain income from supplying labor
and capital to firms and lumps sum profit from the firms producing intermediate goods and
firms producing final goods. In addition the household accumulate debt at the end of the
period t. Furthermore assume that the households purchase one period bonds denominated
in domestic currency. The households can use the proceeds from the maturing bonds to-
gether with their wage earning and their return capital to purchase more bonds, invest in
capital and consumption goods. The excess of households expenditure to the proceeds re-
ceived is financed by borrowing foreign currency from the international capital market. This
represents the constraint faced by the household.
The representative household problem is to choose consumption of final goods and hours
of work that would maximize the households utility subject to the above budget constraint.



































Denote ct, ht, prt, Dt, D
∗
t , Yt, Kt, it, Pt, St as real consumption, hours of work, nominal
domestic interest rate, risk premium from foreign borrowing, nominal domestic bonds (mea-
sured in domestic output), nominal foreign debt (measured in foreign output), final output,
capital, real investment, and the domestic price, and nominal exchange rate. Following Notz
and Rosenkranz (2014), the households budget constraint presented above exhibits liability
dollarization.
We assume the following definition for the gross domestic interest rate and the gross
foreign interest rate as follows.




t−1 = 1 + r
w + prt−1 (2.3)
In borrowing foreign funds, the house has to pay a constant risk free interest rate and
a risk premium. The risk premium in turn is endogenously determined by the amount of























+ (spt − 1) (2.5)
Following Notz and Rosenkranz (2014), the endogenous term of the risk premium equa-
tion above presents a feature of financial frictions.
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The risk premium shock is exogenous follows an AR(1) process of the following form.
lnspt = ρsplnspt−1 + εsp,t (2.6)








This is the inter-temporal substitution condition of the household (Euler equation).







hω−1t = λtwt (2.8)
While the inter-temporal substitution between consumption and purchasing capital is
as follows:
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(2.9)



















































































Note if we combine equations (1.9) and (1.10) we get the uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) condition.
2.2.2 The Firm
The model specification for the production sector is a modified version of Dib (2011). The
goods producing sector consists of domestically produced final goods producing firms and
intermediate producing firms. Assume that there are a unit measure of intermediate pro-
ducing firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] which produces a differentiated product. The final goods
firm produces Yt by combining the intermediate goods Yt(i) as inputs using the following











The final goods firms sells its product in a perfectly competitive market. Given the

















The first order condition of the above problem into the following demand curve for each







For the intermediate goods producing sector, assume that the domestic intermediate
goods is divided between intermediate goods domestically sold,Yht(i),and exported, Yxt(i) so
that
Yt(i) = Yht(i) + Yxt(i) (2.15)








The production function common to all intermediate producing firms in the economy is






The firms producing intermediate goods for use in the domestic economy each acts
as a monopolistic competitor. Assume that the price setting ability of each of these firms
are constraint the demand curve its faces for its product from the representative final goods
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producing firms. In addition each firms producing intermediate goods for use in the domestic
economy faces a convex price adjustment cost proportional to one unit of final goods as
defined by Rotemberg (1982).














































The first order condition for the domestically used intermediate goods producing firms
are the following.












1−α Insert equation 1.20 (2.19)
















φ(πt−1)πt] = 0 (2.20)
Denote the nominal exchange rate as St,following Dib (2011), assume that the interme-
diate goods producers cannot price discriminate so that the export price of the intermediate
good is Pt(i)/St. . It is also assumed that the foreign demand function for domestic exports







The total foreign demand for exports of domestically produced intermediate goods fol-







2.2.3 The Central Bank
Assume that the central bank of the small open economy actively manages short term interest
rate Rt in response to deviation from output Yt inflation πt growth of money supply µt and
the real exchnage rate St. In addition the monetary policy rule faces a monetary policy





















The variables without the time subscripts are in steady state. The monetary policy
shock follows the following law of motion.
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lnνt = ρνlnνt−1 + ενt; ρνε(0, 1) (2.24)
2.2.4 Market Clearing Condition
















(πt − 1)2Yt (2.25)
While the trade balance is given as follows.
tbt = Yt − ct − it (2.26)






Assuming symmetry among all consumers, domestic producers and importers, firms, the







2.3 Parameters and solution method
To obtain the optimal monetary policy parameters, the model in this paper is solved model
by using Sims (2000) second order accurate method. Welfare is evaluated by taking a second-
order Taylor expansion of the utility function around the steady state. The solution of the
model shows that the parameters for optimal for the monetary policy rule for output gap ,
for real exchange rate gap is while the optimal parameter value for inflation gap is . The
calibration for the non-policy parameters follows from Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2003), Peters
(2008), and Unsal (2013). For the elasticity of output with respect to capital α it is set
at 0.32. The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ is set to be 2. The 1 plus the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ω in labor supply is set to be 1.455. The capital
adjustment cost parameter Ψk is set to be 0.028. The debt elastic risk premium parameter Ψp
is set to be 0.000742. These parameter values are consistent with consistent with Schmitt-
Grohe, Uribe (2003). The parameter of monopoly power φ is set to be 10. The parameter
of price adjustment cost is set to be 120. These parameter values are consistent with Unsal
(2013). Following Schmitt Grohe Uribe, the world interest rate in this model is constant. The
world interest rate rw is calibrated to be 0.02102. This implies the consumption elasticity
rate of time preference β is set to be 0.979413. The output gap parameter ρy in the monetary
policy rule is set to be 0.5. While the parameter for the inflation gap ρπ is set to be 0.8098.
This is consistent with Peters (2008).
This current study considers two different monetary policy rules. One which put a small
weight on real exchange rate stabilization ρs in the monetary policy rule (case1). Another
monetary policy rule is to put a large weight (in absolute value) on the real exchange rate
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stabilization in the monetary policy rule (case 2). For the small weight, this paper set the
value of the real exchange rate stability in the monetary policy rule as ρs = 0.15668 . For
the large weight, this paper set the weight on real exchange rate stabilization to ρs = 6 . .
2.4 Analysis
In this analysis will consider the impulse response functions of seven macroeconomic vari-
ables. These variables are domestic output (y), consumption (c), domestic inflation , current
account-to-GDP ratio (ca), trade balance-to-GDP ratio (tb), foreign debt (d) and invest-
ment (i). This study considers five shocks; productivity shocks and foreign output shock
and foreign inflation shock, risk premium shock and monetary policy shocks. The impulse
responses is constructed for the three monetary policy rules; case 1 in which the weight on
real exchange rate stability is low and case 2 in which the weight on real exchange rate
stability is high as specified above and the optimal monetary policy rule case.
2.4.1 Productivity Shock
Consider a positive productivity shock. Following a positive productivity shock, domestic
output (y) rise under the optimal monetary policy rule and, case1 and case 2 monetary
policy rules mentioned above. Similarly, a positive productivity shock result into a rise in
investment (i) and foreign debt (d) in all three monetary policy rule cases. And this shock
results in a rise current account deficit-to-GDP ratio (ca) in all cases. Similarly a positive
productivity shock result into a fall in trade balance surplus-to GDP-ratio in all three cases.
In contrast, consumption and domestic inflation fell due to a positive productivity shock
in case 1 and case 2 but it rose in the optimal monetary policy rule. (Figures 1 to 7 in
the Appendix) On the dynamics of the fluctuations of macroeconomic, between the three
monetary policy rules, the fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables under the optimal
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monetary policy lies in between the monetary policy rules which put high weight on real
exchange rate stability with monetary policy rules which put low weight on real exchange
rate stability.
2.4.2 World output shock
Consider a positive productivity shock. Following a positive world output shock, domestic
output (y) and consumption (c) rise under the optimal monetary policy rule and, case1
and case 2 monetary policy rules mentioned above. Similarly, a positive productivity shock
result into a rise in investment (i) and foreign debt (d) in all three monetary policy rule
cases. And this shock results in a rise current account deficit-to-GDP ratio (ca) in all cases.
Similarly a positive productivity shock result into a fall in trade balance surplus-to GDP-
ratio in all three cases. In contrast, surplus of trade balance-to GDP ratio and domestic
inflation fell due to a positive productivity shock in case 1 and case 2 but it rose in the
optimal monetary policy rule. (Figures 8 to 14 in the Appendix) On the dynamics of the
fluctuations of macroeconomic, between the three monetary policy rules, the fluctuations of
the macroeconomic variables under the optimal monetary policy lies in between the monetary
policy rules which put high weight on real exchange rate stability with monetary policy rules
which put low weight on real exchange rate stability.
2.4.3 Foreign inflation shock
Now turning to a positive foreign inflation shock. Following a positive foreign inflation shock,
this would increase domestic output on impact, then it fall. In addition a positive foreign
inflation shock would increase current account deficit-to-GDP ratio, and domestic inflation.
Furthermore a positive foreign inflation shock increases the trade balance surplus-to-GDP
ratio and foreign debt. Also this shock increases the deficit of current account deficit-to-
58
GDP ratio. However, a positive foreign inflation shock results in a decrease in investment.
(Figures 15 to 21 in the Appendix) Similarly as with Productivity shock and world output
shock, the fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables under the optimal monetary policy
lies in between the monetary policy rules which put high weight on real exchange rate stability
with monetary policy rules which put low weight on real exchange rate stability.
2.4.4 Risk Premium shock
Consider a positive risk premium shock. Following a positive risk premium shock, domestic
output (y) and consumption (c) rise under the optimal monetary policy rule and, case1 and
case 2 monetary policy rules mentioned above. Similarly, a positive risk premium shock
result into a rise in inflation and trade balance surplus-to-output ratio in all three monetary
policy rule cases. However this shock results in a fall current account deficit-to-GDP ratio
(ca) in all cases. Similarly a positive productivity shock result into a fall in foreign debt
and investment in all three cases. (Figures 22 to 28 in the Appendix) Similarly as with
Productivity shock foreign inflation shock and world output shock, the fluctuations of the
macroeconomic variables under the optimal monetary policy lies in between the monetary
policy rules which put high weight on real exchange rate stability with monetary policy rules
which put low weight on real exchange rate stability.
2.4.5 Monetary policy shock
Finally consider a positive monetary policy shock. Following a positive risk premium shock,
domestic output (y) and consumption (c) fall under the optimal monetary policy rule and,
case1 and case 2 monetary policy rules mentioned above. Similarly, a positive monetary
policy shock result into a fall in foreign debt, domestic inflation and current account deficit
over GDP ratio in all three monetary policy rule cases. However this shock results in a
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rise trade balance surplus to GDP ratio in all cases. Similarly a positive productivity shock
result into a rise investment in all three cases. (Figures 29 to 35 in the Appendix). On the
dynamics of the fluctuations of macroeconomic, between the three monetary policy rules,
the fluctuations of domestic output, consumption and domestic inflation under the optimal
monetary policy is the same with monetary policy rules which put high weight on real
exchange rate stability with monetary policy rules which put low weight on real exchange
rate stability except on impact of the monetary policy shock. The fall of domestic output
on impact of the positive monetary policy shock under the optimal rule is less pronounced
than under the other two monetary policy rules. However for foreign debt, current account
deficit over GDP ratio, trade balance surplus to GDP and investment the fluctuations of the
macroeconomic variables under the optimal monetary policy lies in between the monetary
policy rules which put high weight on real exchange rate stability with monetary policy rules
which put low weight on real exchange rate stability.
2.5 Conclusion
By specifying a New Keynesian model with liability dollarization and risk premium shocks,
and computing the welfare maximizing optimal monetary policy, this paper found that the
optimal monetary policy rule is characterized by price stability, output gap stability and
some degree of exchange rate stability. This result is in line with the conclusion of Corsetti,
Dedola and Leduc ( 2011) and Monacelli (2013). In addition the paper found that the
optimal monetary policy rule entails that it is welfare maximizing for agents in the small
open under liability dollarization to tolerate some degree of macroeconomic fluctuations and
some degree of real exchange rate fluctuations.
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Figure 2.1: Domestic output with respect to productivity shock
Figure 2.2: Consumption with respect to productivity shock
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Figure 2.3: Current account deficit to GDP ratio with respect to productivity shock
Figure 2.4: Surplus of trade balance to GDP ratio with respect to productivity shock
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Figure 2.5: Foreign debt with respect to productivity shock
Figure 2.6: Investment respect to productivity shock
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Figure 2.7: Inflation respect to productivity shock
Figure 2.8: Domestic output with respect to world output shock
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Figure 2.9: Consumption with respect to world output shock
Figure 2.10: Current account deficit to GDP ratio with respect to world output shock
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Figure 2.11: Surplus of trade balance to GDP ratio with respect to world output shock
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Foreign Interest Rate Shocks,
Monetary Policy Shocks and Bank
Credit in Small Open Developing




How does foreign interest rate shocks and monetary policy shocks affect the quantity of bank credit
to the domestic private non-financial sectors in small open developing countries? To what extent
does monetary policy can influence the quantity of bank credit in these countries? This paper uses a
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model on a sample of six small open developing countries
to answers these two questions. This paper found that an increase in foreign interest rates can
either increase or decrease the quantity of bank credit, depending on how strong the increase in
foreign interest rate shocks affect total interest income compared to the total interest cost of the
banks balance sheet. On the other hand, it is found that the impact of a monetary contraction is
to reduce the quantity of bank credit, which is consistent with the finding from previous literature.
In addition, it is found that, at best, monetary policy can influence quantity of bank credit only
in the short run. With the exception of Mexico, this paper found that both monetary policy and
foreign interest rates influences the quantity of bank credit in these economies in the longer horizon.
For Mexico, foreign interest rates dominates monetary policy in influencing the quantity of bank
credit in the longer horizon. These results suggests that the monetary authority of the small open
developing countries have limited influence on the quantity of domestic bank credit.
JEL: E44, E51, F34, E52
Keywords: monetary policy, foreign interest rate, bank credit, developing countries
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3.1 Introduction
Macroeconomic stability is an important goal for many nations. An instrument to achieve
this objective is monetary policy. One of the channels in which monetary policy decisions
can be transmitted into changes of macroeconomic variables is through the credit channel
transmission mechanism. According to Adrian and Shin (2011), the global financial cri-
sis which erupted in 2007 has demonstrated the importance of financial intermediation for
macroeconomic stability and monetary policy decision making.
A sector which has an important role in the provision of credit to the private non-
financial sector is the banking sector. In developing countries, the banking sectors role in
credit provision is more important than non-bank financial institutions. According to the
data from The Bank of International settlement, in developing countries, roughly 81 percent
of credit to the private non-financial sector was provided by the banking sector. While in
developed countries, around 56 percent was provided by the banking sector. (See tables A1.
And A.2 in the Appendix).
There is a large literature which focuses on the impact of monetary policy shocks on
bank credit. A notable work among them is the paper by Bernanke and Blinder (1992).
This paper provided the first empirical evidence of the bank lending channel transmission
mechanism for the United States. This paper found that a 1 standard deviation shock of the
Feds Funds Rate (a monetary contraction) results in a fall of the quantity of bank credit, but
with a lag. Vera (2012) extended the work of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) by augmenting
the data set to include current data points. This paper found similar conclusions as Bernanke
and Blinder (1992), but in addition it found that the effect of monetary policy shocks on
quantity of bank credit has significantly decreased over time.
For small open economies, their macroeconomic conditions, and monetary policy de-
cision may be influenced by shocks to foreign interest rates such as shocks to the Federal
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Funds Rate. In turn this shocks may also have an impact on quantity of bank lending to
the private non-financial sector in these set of countries.
Surprisingly, there are relatively few literature which focus on how foreign interest rate
affects quantity of bank credit to the private non-financial sector in a small open economy.
Zanforlin (2011) found that the real effective exchange rate appears to be positively associ-
ated with the quantity of domestic bank credit to the private sector. And the cost of foreign
funding is negatively associated with the quantity of domestic bank credit.
Considering that on one hand for a small open developing economy, opening up its do-
mestic economys financial system results in shocks to international capital markets, such as
shocks to foreign interest rates, exerting some influence on the domestic economy. On the
other hand monetary authority of these countries conducts monetary policy as an attempt to
influence the macroeconomic outcomes of their domestic economy. And based on arguments
previously mentioned above, both monetary policy shocks and foreign interest rate shocks,
may have an influence on the quantity of domestic bank credit to the private non-financial
sector in a small open developing economy. Considering these arguments, it would be in-
teresting to investigate more closely, what is the impact of foreign interest rate shock and
monetary policy shocks on the quantity of domestic bank credit to the private non-financial
sector in a small open developing economy? In addition it would be interesting to analyze
the contribution of monetary policy shocks and foreign interest rate shocks towards variation
of the quantity of domestic bank credit in these set of countries. In particular we ask the
question, among the aforementioned two shocks, which one (if any) dominates the variation
of the quantity of domestic bank credit to the private non-financial sector in these countries?
To the best of the authors knowledge, this is the first paper which poses such questions.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is to contribute to the currently limited
discussion on how monetary policy shock in one hand and foreign interest rate on the other
hand, affects the quantity of domestic bank credit in a small open developing economy. In
86
addition this paper would provide insight on to what extent does central banks of small open
developing economies can influence the quantity of their domestic private bank lending in
the face of foreign interest rates shocks.
3.2 Theoretical argument on how monetary policy for-
eign interest rate can affect bank credit
This section presents three arguments on how monetary policy can effect bank lending to the
private non-financial sectors. The first is the balance sheet credit channel of transmission
mechanism proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1999). The second is the bank lending
channel transmission mechanism proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). The third is the
argument proposed by Adrian and Shin (2011).
3.2.1 Balance sheet credit channel of transmission mechanism.
The balance sheet credit channel of transmission mechanism was proposed by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). This argument posits that a contractionary monetary policy
results to an increase of interest rate. The increase in interest rate result in a fall in the value
of the firms balance sheets. The reason for this result is because of the negative relationship
between price bonds and rate of return of bonds. The rise in the interest rate would decrease
the price of bonds, and thus reduce the value of firms balance sheet.
Assuming that firms are financially constrained, a decrease in the value of their balance
sheets results in the fall in the ability of the firm to supply sufficient collateral to obtain
bank credit. This in the end reduces ability of the firm to obtain bank credit. All else equals
and assuming that banks are willing to supply credit as long as they are provided with
sufficient collateral, thus in the end the quantity of bank credit falls. For future reference
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for the ordering of variables in order to identify shocks in a vector autoregressive (VAR)
analysis, the above argument suggests that bank lending should come after the monetary
policy instrument.
3.2.2 Bank lending channel transmission mechanism.
The bank lending channel transmission mechanism was put forward by Bernanke and Blinder
(1992). The argument is as follows. Given a contractionary monetary policy, this results
in an increase of interest rate. The increase in interest rate result in a fall in the value
of the banks balance sheets. This result in the value of banks assets set aside for reserves
falls. Because banks has to meet their required reserves and may wish to hold a certain
amount of non-required reserves (or excess reserves), thus they may have to reduce their new
lending supplies (and or retire some existing loans by increasing the interest rate charged
on these loans) in order to meet these reserve needs. With the assumptions that firms are
financially constrained, in the end the quantity of bank credit falls. For ordering of variables
(identification of shocks) in a VAR analysis, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) suggests that
bank credit should come after the monetary policy instrument (policy rate of the domestic
economy).
3.2.3 Adrian and Shin (2011)
A third argument on how monetary policy shocks can effect bank lending to the private
non-financial sectors is put forward by Adrian and Shin (2011). This paper uses the concept
of Net Interest Margin and term spread. Net Interest Margin (NIM) in this paper is defined
as the difference between the total interest income on the asset side of the banks balance
sheet and the interest expense on the liabilities side of its balance sheet. It determines
the profitability of bank lending and increases the present value of bank income, thereby
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increasing the forward-looking measures of bank capital. NIM is an average concept that
applies to the stock of all loans and liabilities on the balance sheet. Whereas the term spread
indicates the profitability of the marginal loan that is added to the balance sheet of the bank.
Adrian and Shin (2011) argues that the term spread influences future NIM.
The argument on how monetary policy can affect bank lending according to Adrian and
Shin (2011) is as follows. A monetary contraction result into a rise in short term interest
rate. The rise in short term interest rate results in a fall of the term spread between long-
term and short term interest rate. The fall in the term spread result in a fall the marginal
profitability of an extra dollar of loans in the banks balance sheets. This result in lower NIM.
A fall of NIM result in a fall of the present value of banks income and a fall in the forward
looking measure of banks capital. The fall in the forward looking measure of banks capital
reduces the risk bearing capacity of the banks. And thus banks lending supply falls. With
the assumptions that firms are financially constrained, in the end the quantity of bank credit
falls. For ordering of variables (identification of shocks) in a VAR analysis, the argument
for this paper suggests that bank credit should come after the monetary policy instrument
(policy rate of the domestic economy).
3.2.4 Argument on the impact of a shock to foreign interest rate
on domestic bank lending
To provide an argument how shocks to foreign interest rate affects domestic bank lending in
a small open developing economy which borrows in the international capital market, I follow
and modify the argument from Adrian and Shin (2011).
Given a small open developing economy with a bank system which hold foreign assets
in their portfolio and also borrows from international capital market. Suppose there is a
rise in foreign interest rate. This would increase the cost of borrowing of foreign funds and
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the interest income from holding foreign assets for the domestic banks of the small open
economy. Following the argument of Adrian and Shin (2011), I argue that, due to the rise
in foreign interest rate, there are two possibilities that bank credit may be affected. Bank
credit may increase or instead it may decrease.
For the argument where the effect of a rise in foreign interest rate is to decrease bank
credit is as follows. By the argument of Adrian and Shin (2011), a rise in foreign interest
rate results in an increase of the total interest cost of the liabilities side of the banks balance
sheets. If this increase of the total interest cost is not matched by an increase of interest
income from foreign assets held by the bank, then total interest cost of the liabilities side
increases relative to the total interest income of the asset side of the banks balance sheet.
This would result in reduction of NIM. As argued by Adrian and Shin (2011), a fall of NIM
(or a negative NIM) result in a fall of the present value of bank income and a fall in the
forward looking measure of the banks capital. The fall in the forward looking measure of
the banks capital reduces the risk bearing capacity of the banks. The fall of the risk bearing
capacity of the banks result in bank lending supply to fall. With the assumptions that
domestic firms are financially constrained, in the end bank credit falls.
Conversely if instead, the rise in foreign interest rate increases the total interest income
from foreign assets held by the bank relative to the rise of total interest cost of the liabilities
side. This would result in an increase of NIM. A rise of NIM results in a rise of the present
value of bank income and a rise in the forward looking measure of bank capital. The rise
in the forward looking measure of bank capital increases the risk bearing capacity of the
banks, and thus results in bank lending supply to rise. With the assumptions that domestic
firms are financially constrained, in the end quantity of bank credit rises in this economy.
For ordering of variables (identification of shocks) in a VAR analysis, the above argument
suggest that bank credit should come after foreign interest rate.
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3.3 Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) Model
In this section I outline the setup of the eight variable SVAR model, its identification scheme,
and data used in the analysis. The identification scheme of the SVAR model which I apply
in this analysis is an extension of the model proposed by Kim and Roubini (2000).
3.3.1 The model setup
The model in this paper considers eight endogenous variables. Seven of the variables are
world oil price, Federal Funds Rate, industrial production, consumer price index (CPI), base
money (M1), short term domestic interest rate, nominal exchange rate. These variables
follows directly from the Kim and Roubini (2000) model. In our analysis we add bank credit
to the private non-financial sector to the framework.
The setup of the model is as follows. Let Xt = (opwt, ffrt, ipt, cpit,m1t, rdomt, ert, lt) be
a vector of endogenous variables, where opwt is the world oil price, ffrt is the Federal Funds
rate (which is used as the proxy for foreign interest rate in the model) ,ipt is industrial
production, cpit is consumer price index, m1t is base money, rdomtis domestic interest
rate, ert is nominal exchange rate and lt is bank credit to the private non-financial sector.
















t ) represent a vector of exogenous structural
shocks to world oil prices, the Federal Funds rate, industrial production, consumer price
index, base money, domestic interest rate, nominal exchange rate and the quantity of bank
credit to the private non-financial sector respectively. The system of equations representing
the structural model in vector form can be written as follows.
B0Xt = k +B1Xt−1 +B2Xt−2 + ...+BpXt−p + ut (3.1)













Thus Xt is assumed to follow the vector autoregressive process as follows.
Xt = ψ0 + ψ1Xt−1 + ψ2Xt−2 + ...+ ...+ ψpXt−p + Sut (3.3)
Where S = B−10 Rewriting by using lag operators we get the following.
Xt = ψ0 + ψ(L)Xt + Sut (3.4)
Where L denotes a lag operator such that psi(z) = ψ1z + ψ2z
2 + ...+ ...+ ψpz
p , where
p represents the number of lags in the model. Considering this specification, the moving
average representation is given by:
Xt = (I − ψ1)−1ψ0 + (I − ψ1)−1ψ(L)Sut (3.5)
By the Akaike (1974) information criterion, it is found that 13-lag vector autoregressive
best fits the data.
3.3.2 Structural identification
Since this model apply an extension model of the Kim and Roubini (2000) framework,
the ordering and identification of the seven variables (Fed Funds rate, world oil prices,
industrial production, CPI, M1 monetary aggregate, domestic short term interest rate and
the nominal exchange rate), follows the specification of the aforementioned paper. We extend
the identification scheme of the aforementioned model by adding the quantity of bank credit.
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Consider The Federal funds rate, the world oil price and the exchange rate are variables
as foreign variables, and domestic interest rate, domestic short term interest rate, industrial
production, CPI, M1 and quantity of bank credit as domestic variables. To identify the
structural shocks, we specify an identification restriction on the matrix S . The argument
for the identification scheme is as follows. The first variable is world oil price, and it is
assumed to be exogenous and is not affected by domestic variables contemporaneously. A
second variable is the Federal Funds Rate. This variable is assumed to be affected by world oil
prices contemporaneously, but not by domestic variables. Following from Kim and Roubini
(2000), these two variables are included in the model to isolate and control for the exogenous
component of monetary policy shocks.
The third and fourth variables are industrial production and Consumer Price Index
(CPI). These variable are assumed to be affected contemporaneously by world oil price
and Rate, but are not affected contemporaneously by the Federal Funds, monetary policy
rate, exchange rate or bank credit. Money demand is assumed to be contemporaneously
affected by prices and output. The monetary policy equation is the monetary authority
reaction function which sets the domestic interest rates after observing current value of
money demand, interest rate and exchange rate. In addition it is assumed that the monetary
authority does not take into account current quantity of bank credit in their decision making.
The exchange rate is assumed to be contemporaneously affected by the Fed Funds rate,
world oil prices, industrial production, CPI, M1 monetary aggregate, domestic short term
interest rate). Finally, assume that quantity of bank credit is contemporaneously affected by
all the preceding seven endogenous variables. To justify the restriction that quantity of bank
credit does not affect the domestic interest rate contemporaneously is that, I assume that
the monetary authority reaction function which sets domestic interest rates after observing
current value of money demand, domestic interest rate and exchange rate but not to the
current amount of bank credit. This implies that bank credit does not affect domestic
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interest rates contemporaneously.












1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b2,1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
b3,1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
b4,1 0 b4,3 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 b5,3 b5,4 1 b5,6 0 0
b6,1 0 0 0 b6,5 1 b6,7 0
b7,1 b7,2 b7,3 b7,4 b7,5 b7,6 1 0













The analysis uses monthly data for Chile for May 1995 to November 2015, India for June 1997
to September 2015, Mexico for January 1997 to September 2015, South Africa for January
1997 to November 2015, Colombia for July 1995 to December 2015 and Turkey for January
2002 to December 2015. The world oil prices, the Federal Funds rate and nominal exchange
rate for India data was obtained the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Fred database. The
data for industrial production, consumer price index, base money for all six countries and
domestic short term interest rate for Colombia and South Africa was obtained from the
OECD database. The data for domestic short term interest rate for Chile, India, Mexico
and Turkey, and data for the quantity of bank credit to the private non-financial sector for
each countries was obtained from their respective central banks.
3.4 Results
In this section we discuss the results of the eight-variable SVAR model.
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3.4.1 Impulse Response Analysis
To study the effect of foreign interest rate shocks and monetary policy shocks on the quantity
of bank credit to the domestic private non-financial sectors in small open developing countries
I analyze the impulse responses.
Figure A.1 to figure A.6 in the appendix shows the impulse response function of the eight
endogenous variables with respect to the two shocks which the focus of this study; foreign
interest rate shocks (using the Federal Funds Rate as a proxy), and monetary policy shocks.
The statistical significance of impulse response is examined using the Bayesian Monte Carlo
integration in RATS. The Random Walk Metropolis Hastings method is used to draw 10,000
replications for the SVAR model (see Doan (2013)).
Now let us focus on the impact of quantity of bank lending due to foreign interest rate
shocks and monetary policy shocks respectively. In figure (2), the foreign interest rate shocks
is denoted as (ffr) while monetary policy shocks is denoted as (rdom). Consider the impact
of a positive shock to foreign interest rates. A one percent increase in the foreign interest
rate results an increase in bank credit to the domestic private non-financial sectors in India,
Mexico, Turkey, Colombia and South Africa. To provide a reason for this result, I use the
argument of Adrian and Shin (2011) presented earlier. If an increase in foreign interest rate
increases the total interest income from foreign assets held by the bank by more relative to
the rise of total interest cost of the liabilities side of its balance sheet, this would result in an
increase of Net Interest Margin (NIM). A rise of NIM results in a rise of the present value of
bank income and a rise in the forward looking measure of bank capital. This increases the
risk bearing capacity of the banks, and thus results in the quantity of bank credit to private
sectors to rise.
Conversely for Chile, a one percent increase in the Fed Funds Rate results a decrease
in quantity of bank credit to the domestic private non-financial sectors. Again using the
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argument by Adrian and Shin (2011), if an increase in foreign interest rate increases the
total interest income from foreign assets held by the bank by less relative to the rise of total
interest cost of the liabilities side of its balance sheet, this would result cin a decrease of
(NIM). A fall of NIM results in a fall of the present value of bank income and a fall in the
forward looking measure of bank capital. This decreases the risk bearing capacity of the
banks, and thus results in quantity of bank credit to private sectors to fall.
Now consider the response of bank credit to a monetary policy shock. A one percent
increase in domestic interest rate (a monetary contraction) results in a decrease in the quan-
tity of bank credit to the domestic private non-financial sectors, but with a lag in all six
countries. This result is consistent with the finding of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) for the
United States.
3.4.2 Variance Decomposition
To answer the question, to what extent does monetary policy can influence the quantity of
bank credit in these countries, I analyze the forecast variance decomposition. The analysis
of forecast variance decomposition will focus on variation of amount of bank credit with
respect to variation of foreign interest rate shoks and monetary policy shocks. The results
is presented in table A.3a to A.3b in the appendix.
On impact, monetary policy constitute a larger portion of variation of bank credit
to the domestic private non-financial sectors than the variation of foreign interest rate for
India, and Mexico. But after three months, the variation to foreign interest rate exceeds the
variation of monetary policy instruments with respect to bank credit for Mexico. Conversely,
on impact variation to foreign interest rate constitute a larger portion of variation of bank
credit than monetary policy on impact for Colombia and Turkey. However there are no
significant difference between the foreign interest rate and the variation of monetary policy
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with respect to the variation of the quantity of bank credit for Chile and South Africa on
impact. After 48-months, both the variation of foreign interest rate and the variation of
monetary policy influences the variation of quantity of bank credit to the domestic private
non-financial sectors for Colombia, Turkey, Chile South Africa and India. Only for Mexico,
the variation of foreign interest rate dominate the variation of monetary policy with respect
to variation of quantity of bank credit to the domestic private non-financial sectors. This for
Mexico may be due to the proximity and the level of integration of the economy of Mexico
with the United States (which in this study, The Federal Funds Rate is used as the proxy
for foreign interest rate).
The above result suggest that in addition to monetary policy, foreign interest rates also
influences bank credits in small open developing economies. This result also suggests that
the monetary authority of the small open developing countries may have limited influence
on the quantity of domestic bank credit in the longer time horizon.
3.4.3 Note on degree of capital controls
It should be mentioned that all six countries used in this study has some degree of capital
controls and that their degrees differ. As a measure of degree of capital control, I use
the measure proposed by Fernendez.et.al. (2015). Following Klein (2013), this measure
categorize the degree of capital controls into three levels; open, gate and wall. According
to this measure, an open country virtually has no capital controls on any asset and sample
periods considered in that paper (1990 to 2013). In contrast a wall country has pervasive
capital controls across all, or almost all, categories of assets and sample periods considered
in that study. While a gate country uses capital control episodically, in the sense that these
countries have little or no capital controls in tranquil times but increase or erect capital
controls when faced with capital inflows which threaten to cause unwanted appreciation of
the exchange rate or a destabilizing asset market boom (Klein, 2013).
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Based on the above measure of degree of capital controls, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
South Africa and Turkey fall under the category of gate, while India falls under the category
of wall. Considering the degree of capital controls, this provide explanation on why the
impact of the variation of monetary policy on the variation of quantity of bank credit is
largest for India on impact, and also up to six months as compared to Chile, Colombia,
Turkey and South Africa in the variance decomposition. However for longer horizon (after 6
months), both variation of foreign exchange rate and variation of monetary policy affect the
variation of quantity of bank credit in that country.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper I prompted two questions. The first is, how does foreign interest rate shocks
and monetary policy shocks affects bank credit to the domestic private non-financial sectors
in small open developing countries? The second is, to what extent does monetary policy
can influence bank credit in these countries? The results show that if the increase of total
interest income from foreign assets held by the bank due to the rise in foreign interest rate
is higher than the rise of total interest cost of the liabilities side of the banks balance sheet,
thus bank credit would rise. However if the opposite is true then bank credit would instead
fall. On the other hand, the impact of a monetary contraction is to reduce bank credit.
This result is consistent with the finding from previous literature. In relation to the second
question, the results from variance decomposition suggests that, at best, monetary policy
can influence bank credit only in the short-run. In the longer horizon, both foreign interest
rates and monetary policy influences domestic bank credit. In sum the results suggests that
the monetary authority of the small open developing countries may have limited influence
on the quantity of domestic bank credit for the longer horizon.
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of bank credit to total credit to private non-financial sector for
developing countries
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of bank credit to total credit to private non-financial sector for
developed countries
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Figure 3.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analysis










Figure 3.9: South Africa
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Figure 3.10: India
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